Abstract. This paper introduces an ID based authenticated two pass key agreement protocol of Smart[4] which used the Weil pairing. We propose other an ID based authenticated two pass key agreement protocol which using the Tate Pairing. We will compare protocol of Smart with this protocol.
Introduction
Modern protocol for key agreement was based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol, however this protocol is not key authenticated, so Diffie-Hellman protocol suffers from the man-in-the-middle attack because it does not authenticated the communicating parties. A solution for this problem is to combine a key agreement protocol with a digital signature scheme, so-called an authenticated key agreement protocol(or AK protocol) ( [6, 8] ). In [4] , N. P. Smart proposed an AK protocol using the Weil pairing. The Weil pairing and Tate pairing are used to attack for elliptic curve cryptosystem. Recently the Weil and Tate pairing have been used to construct cryptosystem such as the tripartite Diffie-Hellman protocol of Joux [5] , the identity-based encryption scheme of Boneh and Franklin [1] , the short signature scheme of Boneh, Lynn and shacham [10] , and so on.
Tate pairing is more efficient than the Weil pairing for computation. In section 7, we will show that the computation of Tate pairing is faster than, that of Weil pairing. This paper propose an identity based authenticated key agreement protocol using the Tate pairing.
We now summarize the paper, section 2 introduces the elliptic curve, section 3 introduce key exchange protocol of Diffie-Hellman and manin-the-middle attack on the Diffie-Hellman protocol, section 4 describes the basics of the Weil pairing and Tate pairing, section 5 introduces an AK protocol(ID based authenticated key agreement protocol based on the Weil pairing) of Smart [4] , section 6 proposes other protocol based on the Tate pairing, section 7 shows example of pairings, section 8 show conclusion.
Elliptic curve
Let E/F q be an elliptic curve given by the smooth Weierstrass equation.
Let K(= F q ) be a finite field with q = p m elements, where p is prime and m ≥ 1. The ECDLP in E/F q is defined to find 0 ≤ l ≤ n − 1 such that R = lP given P ∈ E(K) and R ∈< P >, where n is the order of the finite cyclic group < P >. E(K) := {(x, y) ∈ K × K | (x, y) satisfies ( * )} ∪ {O} is called the set of K-rational points of an elliptic curve E, where O is the identity element of the group. The following quantities are related to E, ) results in a curve of the form E : y 2 + xy = x 3 + a 2 x 2 + a 6 . It is well known that the points on an elliptic curve from an abelian group under a certain addition. Let E be an elliptic curve given by the Weierstrass equation ( * ). Let E be an elliptic curve over the real numbers, and let P and Q be two points on E. Then the addition rules are given. If P is the point at infinity O, then −P is also O, and P +Q = Q + P = Q. This means that O will act as the additive identity of the group of points. If P = (
. If P and Q have different x-coordinate, then we can see that the line intersects the curve in exactly one more point R. Then define P + Q to be −R. If Q = −P then we define P + Q = O. The last possibility is if P = Q. If this conditions is true, l would then be the tangent line to the curve at P . Thus "+" makes E into an abelian group with identity element O .
Diffie-Hellman key exchange
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman in their seminal paper ( [9] ) on public key cryptography described a protocol whereby two people, A and B, can derive and share common piece of secret information over an insecure communications channel. We describe this protocol, known as the DiffieHellman key exchange, in terms of an arbitrary group.
<Diffie-Hellman key exchange> Setup: A and B publicly select a finite group G and an element α ∈ G A B
private key
and B now share the common group element α ab . This protocol is not an authenticated key exchange since any third party C could impersonate either A or B. However, the protocol can easily be modified by requiring a central trusted authority to certify ahead of time the element α a for each user A.
This protocol suffers from the man-in-the-middle attack. Suppose an adversary C in capable of intercepting A s communications with B, impersonating A to the other entity and impersonating the other entity to A. We write C(A) to indicate that the adversary C is impersonating A in sending or receiving messages intended for or originating from A. Similarly, C(B) denotes an adversary impersonating B. Let x, y ∈ Z q * be random values of C s choice. We assume that A initiates a run of Diffie-Hellman protocol. The man-in-the-middle attack is then executed as follow:
C(A) intercepts α b from B,and C(B) forwards α y to A.
At the end of this attack, C impersonating A has agreed a key K C(A)B = α xb with B, while C impersonating B has agreed a second key K AC(B) = α ay with A. If these keys are used to encrypt subsequent communications, then C, by appropriately decrypting and re-encrypting messages, can now continue his masquerade as A to B and B to A.
The Weil and Tate pairing
In this section we shall summarize the properties of the Weil and Tate pairing.
The Weil pairing
We let E be an elliptic curve over the field F q with q = p m elements (p is prime, and m ≥ 1). Let l be a positive integer coprime to p, and let µ l be the group of l th roots of unity and let E[l] define a prime order subgroup of an elliptic curve. Let P, Q ∈ E[l] and let A and B be divisors of degree 0 such that and e(P, Q + R) = e(P, Q) · e(P, R).
We can compute the Weil pairing. Let l be an integer coprime to p,
We now define the modified Weil pairing [1] . Let G denoted a prime order subgroup of an elliptic curve E over the field F q . The modified Weil pairing is a map e : G × G → F * q k , defined byê(P, Q) = e(P, φ(Q)) where φ is an automorphism of the group of points on the elliptic curve E. This map satisfies the following properties:
Bilinearity :ê (P + R, Q) =ê(P, Q) ·ê(R, Q), e(P, R + Q) =ê(P, R) ·ê(P, Q).
2. Non-degeneracy : There exists a P ∈ G such thatê(P, P ) = 1. 3. Computable : One can computeê(P, Q) in polynomial time. The Weil pairing was introduced into cryptography by Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone [2] who used it to attack the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem on certain elliptic curve. We note that pairings have recently been used to create several cryptographic primitives, including ID-based encryption ( [1] ) and signature schemes, as well as an identitybased authenticated key agreement protocol ( [4] ). Our focus in this paper is to construct the ID-based authenticated two pass key agreement protocol based on the Tate pairing.
Tate pairing
The Tate pairing was introduced into cryptography by Frey and Rück [3] in their extension of the work of Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone. We use the same notation as in [11] .
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field F q . Let l be a positive integer coprime to p. In most applications l is a prime and l|(q − 1). Let k be a positive integer such that the field F q k contains the l th roots of unity (in other word, l|(q k − 1)). Let G = E(F q k ) and write G [l] for the subgroup of points of order l and G/lG for the quotient group (which is also a group of exponent l). Then the Tate pairing is a mapping
The Tate pairing is defined as follows. Given the point P there is a function g such that the divisor of g is equal to l(P ) − l(O). There is a divisor D is disjoint from the support of g, then the value of the tate pairing is
The Tate pairing satisfies the following properties : 1. Well-defined : t(O, Q) = 1 for all Q ∈ G/lG and
Bilinearity : For any P, R ∈ G, t(P + R, Q) = t(P, Q) · t(R, Q).

Non-degeneracy : If t(P, Q) = 1 for all Q ∈ G/lG then P = O.
We define the modified Tate pairing :
where φ is an automorphism of the group of points on the elliptic curve E.
ID based authenticated two pass key agreement protocol based on the Weil pairing
In [4] , N. P. Smart proposed an AK protocol using the Weil pairing. We now describe this protocol.
Suppose that a subgroup of an elliptic curve for which the modified Weil pairingê maps into the finite field F q k . We assume that the elliptic curve contains a large prime subgroup of order l, such that solving discrete logarithms in the subgroup of order l is also infeasible.
Suppose two users A and B wish to agree a key. The key generation center choose secret key s ∈ {1, ..., l − 1}. The key generation center produces a random P ∈ G and computes P KGS = [s]P . Then key generation center publishes P and P KGS . When users A and B with identity(ID) wishes to obtain a public/private key pair, the public key is given by
where H is a cryptographic hash function(H : {0, 1} * → G). The key generation center computes the associated private key via
S ID(A) = [s]Q ID(A) , S ID(B) = [s]Q ID(B) .
A and B choose a ephemeral privative key a and b respectively. 
, where V is a key derivation function (V :
We show that the secrete shared keys agree,
6. ID based authenticated two pass key agreement protocol based on the Tate pairing
We now construct AK protocol using the Tate pairing. We protocol have two message flows. In the first setup step, the key generation center choose two random points P, Q ∈ G.
Suppose two users A and B wish to agree a key. We assume that the elliptic curve contains a large prime subgroup of order l, such that solving discrete logarithms in the subgroup of order l is also infeasible.
Step 1. Key generation center choose a secret key :
Step 2. Key generation center publishes :
Step 3. Public key of users :
where H is cryptographic hash function(H : {0, 1} * → G).
Step 4. Key generation center generate private key of users,
S ID(A) = [s]Q ID(A) , S ID(B) = [s]Q ID(B)
where
where V is a key derivation function(V :
Theorem. The secrete shared keys agree with users A and B.
Proof.
Example of pairings
In this section, we compare Weil pairing with Tate pairing for computation speed. This example describes in [12] . Example 1. We consider the elliptic curve E/F p : y 2 = x 3 + 1. where p = 5f f f f f f f ac04f 444cf ea7cea7ef ae05bf 8cc5aaa1(≈ 2 160 ) and |E(F p )| = p + 1 = 5f f f f f f f ac04f 444cf ea7cea7ef ae05bf 8cc5aaa2. Then the pair of points in E(F q ) is mapping to F p 2 by Weil pairing. Choose random two points P, R ∈ E(F p ). P = (51c11cb2f 0c6040d13ce61a46f 35b9b0550826b0b, 4b189455128463a7c89e3953ded75cc822db4a23c), R = (5b7f 372f 122c17796f 4025e31af 03c1def 5147a23, 29f 5eac67f e67f 939da0f ba97d8b99f 8ba2cecb9), then e(P, Q) = a 1 α + a 0 ∈ F p 2 with a 1 , a 0 ∈ F p where a 1 = 47902f 1ef aaf 3c3770e750388320048e9aaa86073 a 0 = 19f 98d92d4f 0e1c6ba6d8d8d62e403047de0b3d8d and e(R, Q) Example 2. We consider the elliptic curve E/F p : y 2 = x 3 + 1. where p = 5f f f f f f f ac04f 444cf ea7cea7ef ae05bf 8cc5aaa1(≈ 2 160 ) and |E(F p )| = p + 1 = 5f f f f f f f ac04f 444cf ea7cea7ef ae05bf 8cc5aaa2. Then the pair of points in E(F q ) is mapping to F p 2 by Tate pairing. Choose random two points P, R ∈ E(F p ). P = (163882c78e8378ded60e7c23116a6ba57b4b69036, 3618be44e80f 49aca3482c00b45697e518ab1a66b), R = (5797abdf 028c47eb97949f f abab8223b486409ef f, 1e70e3a03be3bef b5004022f 370850ca0a13d10b3), then t(P, Q) = a 1 α + a 0 ∈ F p 2 with a 1 , a 0 ∈ F p where a 1 = 1a43a6ae8b2cea2d654e2f 10af 270164f 397c99e7, a 0 = 37390e1e03f 49121dd4bb72a024cd1111f 4e8ce7. In example 1 and example 2, we can find that computation of Tate pairing is faster than that of Weil pairing.
Conclusion
We proposed an ID based authenticated key agreement protocol using the Tate pairing. The protocol have two message flows but Tate pairing is more efficient than the Weil pairing in the computation. In the future, we shall work that with efficiency and security.
